RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM
The concrete foreign policy of states and their alliances have always been the closest structure, although not always the most evident, that is linked to profound phenomena in world history involving the state of rises and falls in spiritual, and not exclusively material, driving forces of the global process. In this sense, Russia is a brilliant example. Located at the junction of world civilizations on the global island of the Eurasian continent, it has fulfilled a unique geopolitical mission during the centuries in being the bearer of global balance between the Christian and non-Christian worlds.
Russian foreign policy has had to withstand much, including harsh criticism from within the country. Although the foreign policy department has always been in the most vulnerable of conditions, it has had to answer not only for its own miscalculations and false orientations, but for damages predetermined by the accepted form of the overall false philosophy of state existence and often by the policy of previous governments.
Not once was there a desire to point out the example from the 19th century concerning the status of Russia after the loss in the Crimean War, the loss of the Danube delta, and the status of a Black Sea power. At that time, the brilliant chancellor, M.Gorchakov had enough foresight, political will, and bravery to preserve foreign policy independence in the humiliated state that Russia was in and to refuse to be an instrument in a foreign game and to quite strongly hint at a strategic goal, the restoration of power and the reestablishment of positions. At that time, his famous words resounded, «Russia is concentrating» (»La Russie se requeuille»).
Today, Russias foreign and domestic status is quite a bit more ponderous than it was after the Crimean War, and the tasks facing the department of foreign policy are more complicated. But Russia and its diplomacy have learned much from the past period of humiliations and failures. Delightfully, there is an obvious and gradual formation of a social consensus on matters of foreign policy on the basis of a power-status approach; the starry-eyed Russian liberal was convinced by experience: it was a time when «new thinking» and reformatory pathos were always using exclusively universalistic categories consigning national interests to oblivion and even mockery while the rest of the world, as the whole of history shows, was more willing to make use of the tried and tested old thinking, cynically laying hands on all of the «paternal graves from which to please «universally human» doctrines, repudiated the naive proselytes and their by no means naive inspirers. The Wests «democratic» help to Russia in liberating her from the burden of «imperialist ambitions» was just as «effective» as selfish. Russia gradually lost its geopolitical status which it fought for in Europe, Asia as a whole, and on the seas.
The long-awaited changes in the foreign policy and the immediately subsequent inspiring, new unalterable and irreproachable formation of accentuations in Russian diplomacy allowed for hopes that Russia is «concentrating». Society was tired of humiliation and a well-formed line of foreign policy that defended national interests would now clearly be completely supported.
Every new stage demands an impartial analysis of losses and gains, without which it would be impossible to develop program directives that would facilitate the fulfillment of policy by content that corresponds to the countrys long-term interests and turn the bonds of Russias involvement in world affairs into genuinely constructive relations. For this, there is a need for research on specific international situations and problems on the backdrop of a panoramic analysis centered on the condition of motive forces present in the world at the threshold of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as well as for an indication of the main sources of potential which would allow Russia to obtain the impetus which it has lost.
In a state of a reassessing its value after the break-up of the Soviet Union and its military alliance, the Warsaw Pact Organization, the Russian Federation denied the idea of historical continuity and, consequently, the historical and post-war foundations of its foreign policy, and its traditional spheres of influence by having proclaimed a devotion to the concept of «a united world» on the basis of «universal human values». This line of policy, naturally, was given a response in the form of certain policies of western governments.
International relations of this period had the following results. The historically continuous sea boundaries of Russia came under serious pressure. It is well-known that the fight for an exit to the sea was the main component in world history right up until the final determination of the geographic and political appearance of the earth. Only states that have militarily and strategically ensured exits to the sea can be called powers and are system-forming elements of all that has developed up to now in the world of international relations.
Entire regions on the perimeter of Russias historical sea borders have been declared zones of strategic interests by the USA. The Baltic region has been turned into a sphere of influence by America and NATO with the perspective inclusion of these states into their military and political realm of influence. There has been an urgent development of moral and military conditions for the gradual erosion of the Kaliningrad regions status as an inseparable part of Russia
- Эволюция режима Путина. Внутренний круг и внешние преграды.
- Центральная Азия и Кавказ: новое поле боя ("The Washington Quarterly", США)
- Центральная Азия и Кавказ: новое поле боя («The Washington Quarterly», США)
- Russia in the New Geopolitical Context (part II)
- В Нью-Йорке состоялась презентация книги «Город из стали. Сталинградская битва глазами британских и американских газет»
- Russia in the New Geopolitical Context
- Мир без власти